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PEOPLE V. WHEELER: CALIFORNIA'S ANSWER
TO MISUSE OF THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE*
In People v. Wheeler, the California Supreme Court limited the
scope of peremptory challenges. Under the decision, no juror may
now be challenged from a jury panel on the basis of his group af-
filiation. Such exclusions were found to be violative of the repre-
sentative cross-section requirement for impaneling an impartial
jury. This Comment discusses the court's rationale in deciding
Wheeler. It then examines (1) whether the holding should be ex-
tended to civil litigation, (2) when a "group" becomes legally cog-
nizable, (3) how the burden of proof may be met, and (4) what
the role of the trial judge should be when misuse of peremptories
is charged.
INTRODUCTION
For hundreds of years, peremptory challenge was considered an
absolute privilege.' On voir dire, either party could exclude a
statutory number of jurors for any reason whatsoever.2 The moti-
vation for any given challenge was never questioned. Thus an at-
torney was free to challenge a juror because that juror had a
specific bias or merely because that juror belonged to a particular
* The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Professor Edward
J. Imwinkelried, Professor Dwan V. Kerig, and Professor Charles B. Wiggins for
their suggestions and guidance in the development of this Comment.
1. See generally 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *346-48; C. JOINER, CIVIL
JUSTICE AND THE JURY 40 (1962); L MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM
OF LIBERTY 68-69 (1973).
2. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1970).
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group in society.3
On September 28, 1978, the California Supreme Court modified
the absolute nature of peremptory challenges. In People v.
Wheeler4 and People v. Johnson,5 the court announced that no
California juror may now be challenged because of his group affil-
iation. The scope of peremptories was reduced to encompass only
exclusion for which some evidence or suspicion of specific bias in
the juror exists.6 The motive behind use of peremptories is now
examinable, and that motive cannot be to rid the jury panel of
particular racial or other groups.
This Comment focuses on the historical antecedents of
Wheeler,7 a brief analysis of the opinion itself, and an examina-
tion of the issues raised but not addressed by the decision. Of
those issues, the most important include application of the hold-
ing to civil litigation,8 the meaning of "group" for purposes of ap-
plying the rule in Wheeler, and the burden of proving misuse of
peremptories on voir dire. In the long run, resolution of these is-
sues will determine the breadth of impact Wheeler will have on
the jury selection process.
BACKGROUND
In 1964, during a nationwide civil rights movement, the United
States Supreme Court heard the now-famous case of Swain v.
Alabama.9 Robert Swain, a black defendant, had been convicted
in Alabama state court of rape and sentenced to death.'0 Swain's
appeal contended that the systematic exclusion of all blacks from
his jury violated his rights under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment." In support of this contention, he
submitted evidence that in his county, an average of six to seven
blacks was present on petit jury venires in criminal cases, and yet
3. Actually, the United States and California Supreme Courts never con-
doned peremptory challenges made on the basis of group affiliation. However,
since the challenging counsel was never required to justify any of his perempto-
ries, he was virtually free to exclude jurors on the basis of group membership.
4. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
5. 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978).
6. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
7. Virtually all of the court's reasoning appears in the Wheeler decision.
Johnson is a very short opinion in which the court notes the distinguishing facts,
then applies the Wheeler rationale to reach the same result. Therefore, all refer-
ences to Wheeler apply with equal force and relevance to the Johnson opinion.
8. The court addressed itself to civil litigation, but decided not to rule on
whether the principles propounded in Wheeler should apply to civil suits. 22 Cal.
3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.29.
9. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
10. Id. at 203.
11. Id. at 203, 204.
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no black had served on a petit jury in that county for about four-
teen years.12 More specifically, eight blacks appeared on Swain's
venire; two were exempt, and the other six were peremptorily
struck by the prosecutor.13
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that (1) a defendant is
not entitled to a jury composed of ethnic minorities proportionate
in number to those groups in society;14 (2) there was no evidence
of different standards being applied to prospective white and
black jurors;15 (3) selection of a racially imbalanced jury panel
was not equivalent to purposeful racial discrimination;16 and (4)
the peremptory challenge system (which enabled the prosecutor
to exclude all blacks) did not deny equal protection. 7 The Court
suggested that proof of systematic exclusion of minority group
members over a substantial period of time may indicate denial of
equal protection but the burden of proof was on the defense, and
that burden had not been carried in Swain.18 Accordingly, the
conviction was affirmed.19
Prior to Swain, several commentators had argued that use of
peremptory challenges to exclude minorities from juries violates
the defendant's civil rights.20 After the decision, many more writ-
ers expressed indignation and outrage over the continued abuse
of the peremptory challenge and over the High Court's apparent
tolerance of that abuse.
2 1
12. Id. at 205.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 208.
15. Id. at 209.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 221.
18. Id. at 226, 227. Indeed, one 1975 source reported that in the 10 years follow-
ing Swain, not one black defendant had successfully met this burden. Annot., 79
A.L.R.3d 14, 24 (1975).
19. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 228 (1965).
20. See, e.g., Note, Negro Defendants and Southern Lawyers: Review in Federal
Habeas Corpus of Systematic Exclusion of Negroes from Juries, 72 YALE L.J. 559
(1963); Comment, Racial Discrimination-Systematic Exclusion in Jury Selection,
24 LA. L. REV. 393 (1964).
21. See, e.g., Note, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 41 ALB. L. REV. 623
(1977); Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 1417 (1969); Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of Pro-
spective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 MISS. L.J. 157 (1967); Note, Swain v.
Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52
VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation
of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977); Note, Fair Jury Selection Proce-
dures, 75 YALE L.J. 322 (1965).
Swain stood without serious challenge, however, until 1975
when the Supreme Court compromised-but did not overrule-
that decision in Taylor v. Louisiana.22 In Taylor, a male defend-
ant appealed his conviction by an all-male jury.2 3 Because of local
jury selection procedures, no women appeared on Taylor's ve-
nire.24 Taylor's theory, unlike that of Swain, was that the system-
atic exclusion of women from jury service violated his sixth
amendment rights, specifically, his right to trial by an impartial
jury.2 5 Taylor contended that because all women had been effec-
tively excluded from jury service, he was not tried by a represen-
tative cross-section of the community and, therefore, was denied
the right to have his case heard by an impartial jury.26 The Court
concurred with all of Taylor's contentions and held that
"[restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding
identifiable segments playing major roles in the community can-
not be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial."2
7
Thus, with announcement of Taylor, state courts had to reckon
with two apparently conflicting yet distinguishable Supreme
Court decisions. In Swain, the Court upheld the exclusion of mi-
nority groups from juries if exclusion was effected through per-
emptory challenge and contested on a fourteenth amendment
theory. In Taylor, the Court prohibited exclusion of groups if ex-
clusion was accomplished by unacceptable means of selecting ve-
niremen and contested on a sixth amendment theory. What if the
exclusion of groups was effected by peremptory challenge, but
contested on a sixth amendment basis? The California Supreme
Court answered this hybrid question in 1978.
22. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
23. Id. at 524.
24. Id. Selection of jurors did not prohibit the inclusion of women. However,
to be eligible for jury service, a woman had to file a written declaration expressing
her desire to serve. Apparently, very few women filed such declarations, and jury
venires generally consisted only of men. Id. at 524-25.
25. Id. at 524.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 530. In a decision rendered after Wheeler had been announced, the
United States Supreme Court reiterated the Taylor principles in Duren v. Mis-
souri, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979). In Taylor, women were exempted from jury service un-
less they requested participation. In Duren, women were summoned for jury
service unless they requested exemption. Duren, a male criminal defendant, con-
tended that his right to trial by an impartial jury under the sixth amendment had
been denied because women were underrepresented on jury venires in Missouri.
Specifically, 54% of the adults in the county were female, yet only 26.7% of those
summoned for jury service were women, and only 14.5% on postsummons venires
were women. Id. at 667-68. The Court relied on the principles it announced in
Taylor to reverse Duren's conviction.
It is interesting that Justice White wrote all of the landmark opinions on this is-
sue: Swain, Taylor, and Duren.
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People v. Wheeler28 and People v. Johnson29 both involved black
defendants accused of committing crimes against white victims.
The evidence indicated that the prosecutors in both cases used
their peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from the ju-
ries.30 After conviction by all-white juries, on appeal each defend-
ant pointed to the systematic exclusion of all prospective black
jurors.31 The California court relied on the language in Taylor to
reverse both convictions.32 The court stated that although an ab-
solutely impartial jury is an unattainable goal, this goal could
most nearly be realized only if juries are composed of a represen-
tative cross-section of the community.3 3 If prospective jurors
could be excluded only because of group affiliation, all efforts to
assemble an impartial jury would be compromised.34 The court
resolved potential conflicts with the Swain decision by holding
that it represented only minimum safeguards and that California
under its own constitution may grant more extensive protections
to criminal defendants.
35
Besides having to reconcile its opinion with Swain, the court
was confronted with a state statute which provided that "[a] per-
28. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). Wheeler involved two
black defendants accused of robbing and killing a white grocery store owner. Dur-
ing the jury selection process, defense counsel became aware of apparent efforts
by the prosecution to exclude all blacks from the jury panel. In view of the appli-
cable California statute protecting peremptory challenges, see text accompanying
note 36 infra, the court overruled the defendant's objection and selection of the
jury continued. The result was challenge of seven black jurors by the prosecution.
Trial by an all-white jury ended in conviction of both defendants.
29. 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978). As in Wheeler, the
defendants were black. However,, in this case, the prosecution freely admitted to
efforts to exclude all blacks from the jury. During pursuit and apprehension of the
accused, the term "nigger" and other racial epithets had been used by one or more
of the prosecution's chief witnesses. The prosecutor in Johnson reasoned that any
black juror would almost certainly experience either conscious or subconscious
bias because of the racial slurs which would undoubtedly receive attention in
court. As in Wheeler, the court relied on the applicable statute to protect the pros-
ecution's right to challenge for any or no cause; and, as in Wheeler, the result was
conviction by an all-white jury.
30. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 262-65, 583 P.2d at 752-54, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
893-95; People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d at 297-99, 583 P.2d at 774-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
915-16.
31. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 262-63, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893;
People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d at 297-98, 583 P.2d at 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
32. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 269-70, 583 P.2d at 756-57, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
898; People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d at 300, 583 P.2d at 775-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
33. See cases cited note 32 supra.
34. Id.
35. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09.
emptory challenge is... an objection to a juror for which no rea-
son need be given, but upon which the court must exclude him."
36
Under Wheeler and Johnson, this statute was held unconstitu-
tional as applied to peremptory challenges in a criminal trial on
the basis of group affiliation.37
MEANING AND IMPACT OF THE WHEELER DECISION
In Wheeler, the California Supreme Court announced an un-
precedented principle for jury selection. The opinion exceeded all
standards set by the United States Supreme Court.38 In addition,
a state statute was overturned to the extent it conflicted with the
holding in Wheeler.39 In rendering its landmark decision, the Cal-
ifornia court stressed four very important factors which dictated
the outcome.
First, each juror must be examined individually to separate
those who hold specific biases from those who do not.40 Precon-
ceived notions of how one will think or behave based on his group
affiliation have no place in jury selection. As suspected by the
prosecutors in Wheeler and Johnson, some black jurors may in
fact sympathize with black defendants; but other black jurors will
be impartial. Categorical exclusion of an entire group frustrates
the purpose behind peremptory challenge.4'
Second, peremptory challenge is still available after Wheeler. It
has not been reduced to a "quasi-challenge for cause" as some
fear.42 Any juror may still be excluded if evidence of some spe-
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
37. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276-78, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
903.
38. The United States Supreme Court has been very active and consistent in
mandating that the jury pool (or veniremen) be selected from a representative
cross-section of the community. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940). However, with regard to peremptory chal-
lenges in particular, the Court has been very protective of the absolute privilege to
strike any juror for any reason. Swain is still good law on this point.
It is interesting that the Supreme Court chose to limit challenge for cause when
that challenge was directed at a definable group. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968), the accused was on trial for a capital offense. The trial court al-
lowed challenges for cause against those jurors who expressed opposition to the
death penalty. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that such
challenges were not proper when based only upon common philosophical beliefs.
In view of the Witherspoon decision, Taylor, see note 22 supra, Durem, see note 27
supra, and the California case of Wheeler, the United States Supreme Court may
be inclined to reevaluate the unlimited scope of peremptory challenge.
39. 22 Cal. 3d at 281 n.28, 583 P.2d at 765 n.28, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.28.
40. Id. at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
41. Id. at 277-78, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
42. In her concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bird fears the blurring of chal-
lenge for cause with peremptory challenge. She believes the majority has gone
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cific bias is uncovered on voir dire.43 The juror's background, re-
sponses to questions, or demeanor may reveal a bias; his group
affiliation per se will not.
Traditionally, there have been two proper motives for peremp-
tory challenge. The more frequent motive is a suspicion on the
part of the examining attorney that the juror will be biased
against that attorney, his client, or his case.4 4 That suspicion may
be provable or unprovable; it may be real or it may be errone-
ously inferred from the juror's background and demeanor.4 5 How-
ever, accurate or not, the suspicion must be derived from
examining the juror himself; it may not be the product of precon-
ceived notions. The other motive for peremptory challenge stems
from damage done by the attorney on voir dire. In his efforts to
probe for specific biases, the attorney may alienate the subject ju-
ror.46 Having antagonized that juror, the attorney must excuse
that juror as the only remedy for his own offensive questioning.
Wheeler upsets neither of these bases for peremptory challenge.
The decision is a narrow one and addresses only exclusion on the
basis of group affiliation. 47 A challenge that does not go to a per-
son's group membership is still proper under both statutory and
case law.48
Third, an impartial jury can be drawn only from a representa-
tive cross-section of the communty.4 9 In defining "impartial," the
court confesses that "it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be devoid
of opinions, preconceptions, or even deep-rooted biases .. .
Moreover, "in our heterogeneous society jurors will inevitably be-
long to diverse and often overlapping groups defined by race, reli-
gion, ethnic or national origin, sex, age, education, occupation,
economic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation
too far in restricting use of peremptory challenge. Presumably, she would like to
see the rule in Wheeler confined to racial and ethnic groups rather than groups in
general. Id. at 287, 583 P.2d at 769, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
43. Id. at 274, 583 P.2d at 759-60, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
44. Id. at 275, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 275 n.16, 583 P.2d at 761 n.16, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902 n.16.
47. The court discusses only exclusion because of group affiliation. Neither
the holding nor any of the dicta addressed other misuses of peremptory challenge
or further limitations in the future.
48. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 274-77, 583 P.2d at 759-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
901-03.
49. Id. at 266, 583 P.2d at 754-55, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
50. Id. at 266, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
... *"51 Given these facts, the court reasons that the only practi-
cal way to assemble an impartial jury is to have every identifiable
segment of society available for jury service. With a representa-
tive cross-section of the community will come a representative
cross-section of life experiences and biases.52 The net effects will
be a canceling out of these biases on any given jury and overall
impartiality.
53
Whenever jury selection procedures categorically eliminate
some group in the commmunity from jury service, the "represen-
tative cross-section" goal is frustrated. Whenever this goal is frus-
trated, an impartial jury (as defined by the United States and
California Supreme Courts) becomes impossible.54 To achieve a
representative cross-section, the California court has assumed the
duty of remedying procedures that defeat impartiality. Misuse of
peremptory challenges is one such impermissible procedure,55
and Wheeler is a remedial response to that problem.
Fourth, although Wheeler and Johnson both involved allega-
tions that the prosecution was misusing peremptories, the opin-
ions bind criminal defendants as well as the People.56 It is
notable that the court sought no constitutional basis for binding
the defendant. The court relied heavily upon the sixth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 16, of
the California Constitution in reaching its decision.5 7 However,
both these provisions guarantee rights to the criminal defendant,
not to the People. Concepts of fairness and justice prompted the
court to apply its holding to both parties in criminal prosecu-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
54. Both courts have defined an "impartial" jury in terms of the jury being
composed of a representative cross-section of the community. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220
(1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
130 (1940); People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 748, 278 P.2d 9, 16 (1954).
55. Other procedures which may lead to improper selection of jurors include
summons of veniremen and dismissal of jurors who offer excuses and request dis-
missal. Discriminatory methods of summoning veniremen received extensive
treatment by the court in Wheeler. 22 Cal. 3d at 267-71, 583 P.2d at 755-57, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 896-99. Excusing jurors when they so request and when they offer ade-
quate excuses to support those requests has not proved too troublesome. Trial
judges historically have not abused their discretion in this area. Id. at 273, 583
P.2d at 759, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
56. Id. at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.29. The court held
that "[T]he People no less than individual defendants are entitled to a trial by an
impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. Fur-
thermore, to hold to the contrary would frustrate other essential functions served
by the requirement of cross-sectionalism."
57. Id. at 265, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
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tions.58
Despite the soundness of the court's reasoning on each of the
principles supporting the decision, Wheeler does leave a number
of important issues unresolved. The court left open the issue of
whether Wheeler should be extended to civil litigation.5 9 More-
over, although challenge on the basis of group affiliation is now
forbidden, the court offers no definition of "group."60 Presumably,
the term means something more than just racial groups. Finally,
while the court discusses the burden of proving misuse of per-
emptories, it gives little attention to the discretionary power of
the trial judge.6 1 These unresolved issues have already caused
much confusion and controversy.6 2 Resolution of these issues is
necessary for an understanding of the full impact of Wheeler.
This Comment will predict the judicial resolution of these unan-
swered questions.
EXTENSION OF WHEELER TO CIvIL LITIGATION
Generally, it is good judicial policy for a court to rule on no
more than is necessary to decide the case at bar. Accordingly, be-
cause Wheeler was a criminal prosecution, the misuse of per-
emptories in civil litigation received virtually no attention.63
58. Id. at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.29.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 280 n.26, 583 P.2d at 764 n.26, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 n.26.
61. Throughout its discussion of proof, the court provides for the role of the
trial judge in making decisions. In the final analysis, the court states that it will
"rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for
such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts
of group discrimination." Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. However,
the court never indicates the degree to which the trial judge will be insulated from
appellate review. If reversal in a higher court is a distinct possibility, the judge
might prefer to declare a mistrial rather than risk that reversal. See note 62 infra.
62. In October, 1978, a San Diego County Superior Court judge declared a mis-
trial when the prosecutor challenged two blacks, a Mexican-American, and an
Asian-American from a jury. The prosecutor claimed he was not trying to rid the
jury of all minority group members and that there were specific facts on which he
based his peremptory challenges. Two of the excused jurors had nursing back-
grounds (and the case involved medical proof), one was "less than candid" on voir
dire, and the fourth had two sons who had experienced extensive problems with
the youth authorities. The judge reportedly feared a reversal of any conviction on
the basis of the Wheeler decision if jury selection continued. The incident raised
questions of whether all minorities constituted one group and whether the judge
would be protected from appellate review if he had concurred with the prosecu-
tor's reasons for challenge and allowed the trial to continue. Los Angeles Times
(San Diego ed.), Oct. 19, 1978, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
63. See 22 Cal. 3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.29.
However, misuse of peremptories in civil cases will most likely be
banned by the court when the appropriate case presents itself.
The basis for such extension may be found in the authority relied
upon by the court in Wheeler. Constitutional law, case law, com-
mon law, and statutory provisions were all considered as author-
ity in reaching the decision in Wheeler. So too should these
authorities be considered in determining whether Wheeler should
be extended to bind civil litigants.
Constitutional Basis
At the heart of Wheeler is the constitutional question of
whether groups from the community may be excluded from jury
service on voir dire.64 That same constitutional consideration ap-
plies to civil litigation. Two factors form the basis for such an ex-
tension. First, in Wheeler, the California Supreme Court
reiterated previous holdings that "trial by jury" means trial by an
impartial jury65 and that "impartial" means selected from a rep-
resentative cross-section of the community.66 Second, unlike the
United States Constitution,67 California uses only one constitu-
tional clause to mandate trial by jury in both criminal and civil ac-
tions.68 The clause reads: "Trial by jury is an inviolate right and
shall be secured to all .... 69 Thus it is clear that any interpre-
tation of California's trial by jury guarantee would apply with
equal force to both criminal and civil litigation. The intent of the
framers, by securing jury trial "to all," requires extension of this
"impartial" requirement of Wheeler "to all." Wheeler prescribes
the proper role for peremptories in assembling an impartial
jury.70 This role cannot vary according to the nature of the litiga-
tion. To allow such variance would be to apply different stan-
dards to the same constitutional provision.
Case Law Authority
In Wheeler the California Supreme Court looked to both its own
and United States Supreme Court decisions. 71 Most of the United
64. Id. at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
65. Id. at 265, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
66. Id. at 266, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
67. The right to a trial by jury in a criminal prosecution is guaranteed by the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. The right to trial by jury in a
civil action is guaranteed by a separate amendment, the seventh.
68. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
69. Id. Besides guaranteeing trial by jury to both civil and criminal litigants,
the section delineates jury votes necessary to reach a verdict in a civil case and
identifies requirements for waiver of a jury in either criminal or civil cases.
70. 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 759-60, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
71. Id. at 267-71, 583 P.2d at 755-57, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896-99.
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States Supreme Court cases cited in Wheeler involved appeals
from criminal convictions.7 2 However, one case, Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co., involved a civil action and the same "representative
cross-section" requirement was found applicable to the selection
of civil action juries.7 3 In Thiel the local jury commissioner used a
system of summoning prospective jurors which effectively ex-
cluded all daily wage earners.7 4 In disapproving this systematic
exclusion, the High Court held that "[t]he American tradition of
trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or
civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community."75 Although the
United States Supreme Court may not be prepared to go as far as
California in limiting peremptory challenges,7 6 the High Court
clearly holds in Thiel that both criminal and civil actions are sub-
ject to the same protections with respect to jury selection.
7 7
Wheeler refines the nature of jury selection in California: Peremp-
tory challenges cannot be used to frustrate the representative
cross-section requirement.7 8 Thiel indicates that what is proper
for one kind of action is proper for the other;7 9 thus Wheeler
should apply with equal force to civil litigation.
Principles of English Common Law
The California Supreme Court also looked briefly to English
common law for authority in its holding. Common law principles,
as noted by the court, "demanded the strictest impartiality" from
juries.80 To achieve this impartiality, a sophisticated process for
impaneling juries was developed.8 1 This process includes juror
qualification statutes, 82 challenges for cause,8 3 peremptory chal-
72. E.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493
(1972); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
73. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
74. Id. at 221.
75. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
76. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
77. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
78. 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 759-60, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
79. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
80. 22 Cal. 3d at 266, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
81. See generally 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *344-48; C. JOINER, CIVIL
JUSTICE AND THE JURY 40 (1962); L. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUI
OF LIBERTY 68-70 (1973).
82. See authorities cited note 81 supra.
83. Id.
lenges,84 and strong oaths of impartiality.85 Significantly, there
was little distinction at common law between jury selection for
criminal and civil actions.86 Occasionally, extra protections were
afforded the criminal defendant-for example, availability of per-
emptory challenges87-but with time, all these privileges and
processes were universally applied.88 Had the scope of peremp-
tory challenge been altered in criminal trials at common law, no
doubt that change eventually would have been reflected in the se-
lection of any kind of jury. Thus, to rely on the English common
law for authority is to realize that the same jury selection
processes, privileges, and requirements are applicable to both
criminal and civil cases.
Verdicts: Criminal and Civil
The requirements for verdicts in California also form a basis for
extending the rule in Wheeler to civil litigation. Those who use
peremptories to exclude groups from juries presume group sym-
pathies or biases. In Johnson, for instance, the prosecutor feared
that black jurors would feel hostility toward his white witnesses
and sympathy for the black defendant. 89 If this proposition were
true with respect to certain jurors, the effect would be more dam-
aging in a criminal prosecution. California requires a unanimous
verdict to convict in criminal cases, but only nine votes for a ver-
dict in civil suits.90 In a criminal case, one adamant juror, clinging
to his group sympathies, can force a hung jury. However, three
group-biased jurors could not alter a civil verdict.91 Therefore, the
threat of preconceived group bias leading to an unjust verdict is
84. Id.
85. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *302; 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*365.
86. See authorities cited note 85 supra.
87. 4 W. BLACKSTONE *353; L. MOORE, THE JuRY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF
LIBERTY 56, 68-70 (1973).
88. 4 W. BLACKSTONE *353.
89. People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d at 298-99, 583 P.2d at 774-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
916.
90. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
91. Id. Although the court would never condone jury verdicts based on group
biases or sympathies, it recognizes that certain "opinions, preconceptions, or even
deep-rooted biases [may be] derived from ... life experiences [as members of a
group]." Rather than deny the existence of such biases, the court allows for them
in formulating procedures for assembling an overall impartial jury. "[T]he only
practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the representation
of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective biases of their mem-
bers, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each other out." Peo-
ple v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 754-55, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896. Thus it
is important that as many groups as possible be represented on jury panels so that
all "opinions, preconceptions.., deep-rooted biases [and] ... life experiences"
in the community may be properly represented.
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much more prominent in criminal than in civil cases. Because the
California court has already banned misuse of peremptories in
criminal prosecutions, extension of the rule to civil suits would
have substantially less significance. The potential for injustice
because of the presence of group-biased jurors is minimal in civil
as compared to criminal actions.
Indeed, there is no apparent reason for confining Wheeler to
criminal prosecutions. In addition to constitutional considera-
tions, case law, and common law principles, the California
Supreme Court relied on concepts of fairness and justice. The
court found "essential functions served by the requirement of
cross-sectionalism." 92 Such "essential functions" are no less im-
portant to a plaintiff or defendant in a civil suit than they are to
the prosecution or defense in a criminal case. Use of perempto-
ries to exclude groups from jury service is intolerable in either
kind of action.
DEFINITION OF "GRouP"
Quite aside from the extension of Wheeler is the issue of to
whom it will be applied. The court recognizes that "group" is a
nebulous term, but declines to offer any definition or guidance for
applying it.93 Having found "no doubt" that black jurors consti-
tute a cognizable group, the court found "no occasion to explore
the point further" in the context of Wheeler.94 Thus it is left to
the trial courts to determine just how broadly the term "group"
should be applied. There are a number of available guidelines to
aid in making this determination.
Because the challenged jurors in both Wheeler and Johnson
were black, notions of "suspect classifications" 95 and "discrete
and insular minorities" 9 6 are immediately suggested. The groups
92. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 906 n.29.
93. Id. at 280 n.26, 583 P.2d at 764 n.26, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 n.26.
94. Id.
95. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In writing for the majority
in Korematsu, Justice Black stated, "[All legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect .... [The] courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216. Since Korematsu, the number
of groups identified as "suspect classifications" has expanded. See notes 98, 99, 100
infra.
96. While "suspect classifications" grew out of equal protection cases such as
Korematsu, "discrete and insular minorities" is a term that had its origins in a due
that fall into these categories include those based on race, 7
ethnicity,98 alienage, 99 and possibly gender'0 0 and seem likely
subjects for misuse of peremptory challenges. The origin of these
suspect classifications, however, is quite different from the consti-
tutional basis of Wheeler. Suspect classifications were developed
to activate strict standards of judicial review under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 0 ' Wheeler, on the
other hand, was decided under article I, section 16 of the Califor-
nia Constitution and the sixth amendment of the United States
Constitution. 0 2 Moreover, in Wheeler, the issue is the rights of
the litigants, not those of the jurors who may be peremptorily
struck. Applying suspect classification principles to the jurors
would confuse the real parties in interest in Wheeler. Therefore,
although suspect classifications could provide a definition of
"group," they have no real relevance in Wheeler.
Case law provides a second guide for defining "group."
Throughout much of this century, the United States Supreme
Court and other federal courts have ruled on juror qualification
and exemption statutes. Certain state laws have rendered various
segments of society either incompetent to serve on juries or im-
mune to otherwise mandatory jury service laws. Occasionally, ag-
grieved litigants have appealed trial court decisions on the theory
that their cases were not heard by a representative cross-section
of the community because of local juror exemption statutes.103 In
reviewing these appeals, the United States Supreme Court and
other federal courts have invariably considered three essential
factors. First, the courts determine whether the excluded group is
"substantial" and thereby represents a visible segment of soci-
process case. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In his
now-famous footnote 4, Justice Stone said, "[P]rejudice against discrete and insu-
lar minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the op-
eration of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry." Id. at 152 n.4.
97. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
98. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
99. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
100. A majority of the United States Supreme Court failed to hold discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex to be subject to strict scrutiny in Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973), although four justices joined in holding that sex should be a
suspect classification. Subsequent decisions have held that gender is not a sus-
pect classification. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Bo-
ren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
101. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
102. 22 Cal. 3d at 265-66, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
103. See cases cited note 38 supra.
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ety.10 4 The second consideration is whether the alleged group is
"identifiable" and distinguishable from other members and/or
groups in the community. 05 Finally, the courts determine
whether the group members possess a perspective that exists as a
function of the group membership.106 If the answers to all these
questions are affirmative, then a "legally cognizable group" ex-
ists,107 and local statutes that exempt or disqualify such groups
from jury service are unconstitutional as violative of the represen-
tative cross-section requirement.
Under the United States Supreme Court's test, blacks already
constitute a legally cognizable group.08 Black Americans repre-
sent a substantial part of society, they are identifiable, and they
possess a common perspective and experience that result from
being black in American society. Other cognizable groups have
been found in areas of occupation, 0 9 age,"O ethnicity,"'1 and gen-
der.1 2 Conversely, such seemingly distinct groups as the poor" 3
and the young" 4 have failed to satisfy the Supreme Court's
test."5 Exemption or disqualification of these groups from jury
service has been held constitutional and does not violate the rep-
resentative cross-section requirement under the test.
104. Duren v. Missouri, 99 S. Ct. 664, 668 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530 (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
105. See cases cited note 104 supra.
106. Id.
107. "Legally cognizable group" is used here as a term of art. It refers to
groups found to satisfy the three-part test.
108. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940).
109. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (daily wage earners).
110. United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970) (people between the
ages of 21 and 34 years). It should be noted, however, that Butera is apparently
the only case finding a legally cognizable group based on age.
111. United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 115 F. Supp. 392 (D.V.L 1953) (Pu-
erto Rican Americans).
112. Duren v. Missouri, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
113. United States v. McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. La. 1973).
114. United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affid, 468 F.2d
1245 (2d Cir. 1972).
For a more comprehensive treatment of which groups have been found to be le-
gally cognizable and which have not, see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCE-
DURES 45-83 (1977); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of
Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977).
115. The federal courts have been very unpredictable with respect to finding le-
gally cognizable groups. For example, the Fifth Circuit refused to acknowledge
Cuban-Americans in Florida as such a group. United States v. Gooding, 473 F.2d
425, 429 (5th Cir. 1973).
Although the legally cognizable group test is helpful, the United
States Supreme Court's findings are too restrictive to provide ab-
solute guidance in California." 6 The California Supreme Court
was equally concerned with the existence of a given group and
the motive for challenging members of that group. Exclusive reli-
ance upon previous United States Supreme Court decisions to as-
certain whether a group is legally cognizable could seriously
compromise Wheeler. Poor people, for instance, apparently do not
constitute a cognizable group under the United States Supreme
Court test. 17 Yet if a party to litigation uses peremptory chal-
lenges to blatantly strike all poor people, that party should not be
allowed to hide behind a United States Supreme Court decision
to validate those challenges. Striking poor people from the jury
because they are poor contravenes Wheeler. The objecting coun-
sel should be allowed to offer proof that poor people form a sub-
stantial and identifiable group possessing distinctive perspectives
and experiences in the prospective juror's community. Whenever
necessary, the testimony of local sociologists and other experts
may be used to support the claim. Under no circumstances, how-
ever, should a party be precluded from an opportunity to prove
the existence of a cognizable group if an improper motive for
challenging that group can also be shown.
To be sure, application of a pervasive definition of "group" will
cause much controversy-perhaps even outrage-in the legal pro-
fession." 8 A whole body of research and thought has developed
to pinpoint biases connected with group affiliation.n9 Moreover,
the practitioner develops personal notions of group biases and
sympathies through his own courtroom experiences. Armed with
such research and personal experience, the trial attorney can
116. Although the California Supreme Court in Wheeler looked to United States
Supreme Court decisions to examine the importance of the representative cross-
section requirement, the California court did not rely on the High Court to find a
definition for "group." In deciding Wheeler, the California court certainly never in-
tended to require that the existence of a "group" be found by the federal courts
before that group came within the purview of the holding in Wheeler.
117. United States v. McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. La. 1973).
118. Apparently, some attorneys have developed the philosophy that an impar-
tial jury will result from a selection process which causes both parties to the ac-
tion to be satisfied with the panel. The argument suggests that each party is
empowered to whittle away at the jury by use of challenges until only those jurors
mutually acceptable to both sides remain. However, this concept of an "impartial
jury" cannot be squared with the Supreme Court's requirement of a representa-
tive cross-section. Moreover, such a system can result in situations analogous to
Swain.
119. See, e.g., F. BAILEY & H. R THBLATT, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL ADvo-
CACY (1974); EDUCATION SYSTEMS AND PUBLICATIONS, BIASES AND PREJUDICES
AMONG JURORS (1970); LAW AND TACTICS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES (G. Shadoan
ed. 1964); 1 B. MANNING, THE CRIMINAL TRIAL Procedure (1975).
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make educated guesses about a given juror's biases.120 By classi-
fying that juror according to his group membership, the attorney
can apply the "odds" that the juror will be either friendly or hos-
tile and challenge accordingly. Thus, to the practitioner, Wheeler
may defy reason and experience. If certain groups have been
shown to possess certain biases, it might be asked, why not allow
the exclusions of those groups from jury service?
The answer to the practitioner's objection, of course, rests in
the purpose behind the peremptory challenge. To assemble a rep-
resentative cross-section of the community, no "substantial and
identifiable" segment can be arbitrarily eliminated. Not every
black juror will be sympathetic to black defendants. Nor will
every military person believe that "if a man is arrested, he is
probably guilty" as suggested by one study.121 Voir dire provides
the opportunity to determine whether a particular black or a par-
ticular military person holds those or other specific biases. The
results of research and personal experience continue to be of
value to the practitioner because they alert the attorney that a
given juror may possess certain biases. However, until some evi-
dence of bias in a specific juror is raised on voir dire, challenge
because of group affiliation cannot be allowed. Peremptory chal-
lenges serve the practitioner when there is not enough demon-
strable evidence to challenge for cause. However, it is essential
that some evidence exiSt,122 and that evidence cannot be based on
preconceived notions of group behavior.123
Naturally, as the identity and existence of a given group be-
120. As an example of how certain biases seem to trail certain groups, one
source advises criminal defendants to avoid retired police officers, military men,
and their respective wives. "They have adhered to a strict line of conduct through-
out their lives ... [and] believe if a man is arrested, he is probably guilty." Con-
versely, salesmen, actors, artists, and writers are highly desirable to the criminal
defendant. 'They have enjoyed wide and varied experiences, have witnessed the
good and bad in people and are prone to forgive an indiscretion in another." F.
BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATr, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL ADVOCACY § 337 (1974). A
second such study revealed that white male Protestants between 40 and 49 years
of age who are college graduates and professionals make the most unbiased ju-
rors. EDUCATION SYSTEMS AND PUBLICATIONS, BIASES AND PREJUDICES AMONG JU-
RORS 20 (1970). The numbers of such studies are inexhaustible. Moreover, the
results of each are reasonably consistent with the others. See, e.g., authorities
cited note 119 supra.
121. F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL ADVOCACY § 337
(1974).
122. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
123. Id.
come more obscure (for example, it is more difficult to recognize
groups based on education or occupation than on race or sex),
proof becomes more difficult. However, there must be some re-
course for the aggrieved party when his opponent flagrantly mis-
uses peremptory challenge to exclude all members of a given
group from jury service. A remedy-specifically, the one outlined
in Wheeler-must be available.
ISUSE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: SATISFYING THE BURDEN OF
PROOF
The last important issue raised by Wheeler is proof of group ex-
clusion and the role of the trial judge in evaluating that proof.
The California Supreme Court goes to some length in outlining
procedural guidelines for satisfying the burden of proof. Unques-
tionably, the resulting test is inexact, yet the standard is work-
able. The sound discretion of the trial judge is at its heart.
According to Wheeler, when misuse of peremptories is sus-
pected, a timely objection should be raised.12 4 Out of the jury's
hearing, the party alleging misuse points to the record to show
the probability of challenge because of group association rather
than specific bias.125 If the alleging party makes a prima facie
case for misuse, the burden shifts to the other party to "satisfy
the court that ... such peremptories . . . were reasonably rele-
vant to the particular case on trial or its parties or its wit-
nesses." 12 6 It then becomes the duty of the trial judge either to
overrule the objection or to declare a mistrial.1
27
Without question, the efficacy of this remedy turns on the
sound discretion of the court.128 The judge must be vested with
the power to evaluate verbal responses, demeanors, facial expres-
sions, voice inflections, and more in rendering his decision.
2 9
While the trial record may be of value in proving specific bias in a
juror, almost as often as not the real source of suspicion will be
the juror's demeanor. 3 0 By remaining aware of behavior and atti-






130. In his dissent, Justice Richardson predicts that the test will prove time-
consuming and lead "to procedural quicksand and a quagmire." Moreover, he pos-
tulates, the prosecutor will be free to claim "some unprovable suspicion of sympa-
thy for the defendant" as the basis of exclusion of a juror, and thereby escape the
standard altogether. Id. at 293, 583 P.2d at 772, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14. Certainly,
Justice Richardson will be proved correct if the trial judge pays attention only to
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tudes, the judge will be in a position to rule on allegations of ex-
clusion of groups from service.
In practical application, the exclusion of one black from jury
service will probably raise no allegations of misuse of perempto-
ries. If such an allegation is made, the judge will certainly give
the accused attorney the benefit of the doubt, even if the judge
detected no reason for exclusion himself. However, as one chal-
lenge becomes three or five or seven, the attorney alleging misuse
acquires a stronger basis for making his prima facie case. The
judge's observations become critical. The alleging attorney will
offer evidence that members of a substantial and identifiable
group are being challenged for no reason other than their group
affiliation. It will be the duty of the trial judge to weigh this evi-
dence to decide whether a prima facie case has been made.131
In rebutting an accusation of misuse, the attorney accused of
misusing peremptories may rely on facts in the record to defend
his challenges. He may argue that information obtained on voir
dire indicates the possible existence of specific biases in the chal-
lenged jurors. In the alternative, the accused attorney may refer
the judge to some "bare look or gesture"'132 shown by certain ju-
rors which gave rise to suspicions of bias. Such "bare looks and
gestures," of course, would not appear on the record, yet they are
just as valid a basis for challenge as any demonstrable facts
which do appear on the record.
33
In weighing the contentions of each attorney, the judge may
have noted the same disqualifying or legitimately undesirable fac-
tors in the jurors' backgrounds, whether those factors appear in
the record or in the jurors' demeanors. If so, then the judge will
properly overrule the alleging party's objection. Alternatively, the
judge may see some limited merit to the challenges, but choose
only to warn the accused party that suspicions of misuse are
the record. The judge as well as the examining attorney must be sensitive to spe-
cific biases as communicated through looks, gestures, voice, and attitude.
131. It is during the prima facie showing of misuse of peremptories that a good
record is made. In the context of alleging misuse, all arguments concerning the
existence of a group and the exclusion of that group will be recorded. Having
heard the arguments from both sides, the judge will have the benefit of this record
to support the soundness of his final ruling.
132. "Bare looks and gestures" which suggest the existence of a specific bias
will support a properly used peremptory challenge. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
at 275, 583 P.2d at 760-61, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
133. Id.
growing and that future challenges to subject group members
must be on solid bases. Finally, the judge may agree with the al-
leging party, rule that there exists no basis for the challenges, and
declare a mistrial. The judge's advantages of presence and imme-
diacy are central to his evaluation of these allegations and rebut-
tals.'3
The judge in this role must be protected from judicial review
unless an abuse of discretion is extreme. Threatened by reversal,
the judge will always have his eye on how the trial record will
look to the appellate courts. "Bare looks and gestures" of the ex-
cused jurors will receive less weight than they should when the
trial judge renders his decision. He will know that the higher
courts have only the trial transcript on appeal. Therefore, the ap-
pellate courts should encourage the trial judge to consider all
available factors when misuse of peremptories is charged. This
policy can follow the trial judge reciting for the record the basis
for his rulings and the appellate courts overruling only clear
abuses of judicial discretion in making those rulings.
This involvement of the trial judge in jury selection is hardly
novel and should be welcomed. Broad discretionary powers are
already vested in the judge with respect to challenge for cause.
By extending these powers to peremptory challenge-and nar-
rowing them substantially to relate only to group exclusion-the
judge merely serves as a check on selection procedures.135 Thus
what used to be a given attorney's unmitigated license to shape
the jury without proper motive has become a workable procedure
much more in keeping with the basic tenets of the judicial sys-
tem.136
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, Wheeler simply restates and refines basic
common law and constitutional tenets: The triers of fact should
be selected at random from a representative cross-section of the
community. An attorney's privilege-to exclude jurors for any or
no reason--cannot defeat, such a basic principle of the judicial
system. Of course, the nature of peremptory challenges makes
proof of their misuse difficult. Judges may struggle with many in-
tangible factors in ruling on an objection. However, the ultimate
test of Wheeler lies in noting the nature of voir dire both before
and after the decision.
134. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 277-78, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
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Prior to Wheeler, peremptory challenges did not cause any de-
lay during jury selections. Each party had an absolute right to
challenge without explaining that challenge. 3 7 The judge's duty
consisted of little more than thanking and excusing the juror.
However, despite its procedural simplicity, the system allowed
parties to use statistical or intuitive insight to predict the behav-
ior of entire groups and exclude those groups on that basis. Chal-
lenges on the basis of such "insight" are repugnant to impartiality
and result in gross injustices. 138
Now, under Wheeler, the California Supreme Court has taken
the step necessary to minimize such injustices. The jury commis-
sioner's summons for veniremen, challenges for cause, peremp-
tory challenges, and final impanelment are all subject to review.
At no point may the representative cross-section rule be compro-
mised. No doubt trial judges will err on occasion in ruling on
whether peremptories are being misused. However, the conse-
quences of such errors are relatively insignificant in view of the
benefits derived from the Wheeler decision. If a judge fails to rec-
ognize misuse, the aggrieved party will be no worse off than he
would have been prior to Wheeler. If the judge incorrectly sus-
tains an objection and declares a mistrial, voir dire simply begins
again with a new pool of jurors. A day or more of voir dire will be
lost; and in an era of crowded court calendars, such a result is un-
desirable. However, the benefits of providing the most impartial
jury possible seem to carry much more force and urgency than
the inconvenience of short delay.
Through Wheeler, the California Supreme Court has taken the
initiative in limiting the scope of peremptory challenges. The
common law privilege had evolved into an absolute right to hand-
pick juries. Wheeler returns the privilege to its proper role by re-
quiring the existence of a specific bias before a juror may be chal-
lenged. All that remains is for the court to extend the holding to
civil litigation, maintain the broad tests for "group," and give no-
tice to other appellate courts that the rulings of trial judges
should be sustained when those trial judges have ruled on
"Wheeler" objections. By doing so, the court will succeed in
granting all litigants the right to have their cases heard by a rep-
resentative cross-section of the community.
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1970).
138. Swain probably represents the best example of such injustices.
ADDENDUM
In May 1979 the California Supreme Court dealt a severe blow
to Wheeler principles when it decided Rubio v. Superior Court.13
9
Rubio contended that he had been denied a representative cross-
section of the community on his jury venire because ex-felons
and resident aliens were statutorily excluded.140 In a four-to-
three decision, the court refused to designate ex-felons and resi-
dent aliens legally cognizable groups and found that exclusion of
these groups was permissible.141
In reaching its conclusion, the court held that a group could not
be excluded if (1) its members possessed a particular perspective
which they acquired because of their membership in the group
and if (2) that perspective cannot be represented by others in the
community.142 The majority concluded that ex-felons and resi-
dent aliens did possess perspectives tied to group membership
but that those perspectives could be represented adequately by
others. The perspective of ex-felons could be represented by
other individuals who had been deprived of their freedom by the
state-for example, those convicted of misdemeanors, youthful of-
fenders, and those previously confined in mental institutions.
143
The perspective of resident aliens could be represented by natu-
ralized citizens because all naturalized citizens were resident
aliens at one time. 44 Therefore, in the view of the majority, the
statutory exclusion of ex-felons and resident aliens did not elimi-
nate the perspectives of these groups from juries. Rather, the
statutes simply limit those who are competent to represent those
perspectives on juries.
145
In dissent, Justice Tobriner provides a cogent discussion of how
Rubio defeats many of the representative cross-section princi-
ples. First, he notes that no other cognizable group had ever been
subjected to a supposition that others might adequately represent
that group's perspective. In Hernandez v. Texas, 46 for instance, it
was never an issue whether the perspective of Chicanos could be
represented by other minority groups. Exclusion of Chicanos in
itself was enough to violate the representative cross-section
139. 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979).
140. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 198, 199 (West 1954).
141. Interestingly, Justice Mosk authored both the Wheeler and the Rubio opin-
ions.
142. 24 Cal. 3d at 98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
143. Id. at 99-100, 593 P.2d at 599, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
144. Id. at 100, 593 P.2d at 599-600, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 738-39.
145. The court also rejected allegations that the subject statutes violated the
equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions.
146. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
[VOL. 16: 897, 1979] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
rule.14
7
Tobriner also takes issue with the notion that one group can
represent the perspectives of another if the first group had once
held a status similar to that of the second (excluded) group. To-
briner notes that many businessmen were once wage earners, yet
the Court in Thiel'4 8 held that wage earners could not be ex-
cluded from jury service.149 Tobriner's point may be further
strengthened by considering the effect of the majority's holding
on other groups. Under the majority's reasoning, young people
could be excluded from jury service because older people were
once young. Similarly, those without a college education could be
excluded because college graduates can remember when they did
not have a degree; and nonparents could be excluded because
parents can remember when they did not have children.
Another of Tobriner's objections focuses on the suppression of
community perspectives on juries. A fair cross-section of the
community, he says, reflects the relative proportions of group per-
spective as they exist in the community.15 0 By excluding certain
groups from jury service, significant perspectives in the commu-
nity will be underrepresented on juries except to the extent that
others may represent those perspectives. Although the majority
in Rubio may not eliminate the representation of certain group
perspectives on juries, it radically suppresses such perspectives
as they exist in the community; and suppression is but one step
removed from elimination.
Finally, Tobriner points out the basic inconsistency between
the Rubio decision and the principles that were the basis of
Wheeler. In Rubio, the majority feared that ex-felons and resi-
dent aliens would make undesirable jurors as a whole. Ex-felons
might resent the very system that convicted them, and resident
aliens may not feel urgency for a just verdict.' 5 ' However, such
group-based assumptions are inconsistent with Wheeler. The
court in Wheeler held that group stereotypes could not be used to
support exclusion of an individual from jury service. Each juror
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must be examined individually to determine whether suspicions
of group bias are in fact applicable to that juror. Not all black ju-
rors are sympathetic to black defendants. Similarly, not all ex-
felons resent the judicial system, nor do all resident aliens feel
apathy toward just verdicts. Rubio stands to compromise the
strong Wheeler principle that an individual cannot be judged by
his group affiliation. Judgment should be reserved for examina-
tion on voir dire.
In the final analysis, the courts are not competent to judge
whether one group can adequately represent the perspective of
another.15 2 Even if they were able to make such a determination,
they should not. Before any individual or group may be excluded
from jury service, the state should be required to show a compel-
ling state interest to support the exclusion. This "compelling
state interest" should prove to the satisfaction of the court that a
particular exclusion is more important to state interests and judi-
cial fairness than maintenance of sixth amendment protections
and the representative cross-section rule in its purest form.
Hence, the exclusion of minors, those deemed mentally incompe-
tent, and those unable to speak English may be justified on this
ground, 5 3 although people in these categories most certainly
comprise legally cognizable groups. However, such was not the
approach in Rubio. Ex-felons and resident aliens were not ruled
incompetent; they were found excludable simply because others
might be competent to represent their prespectives. Such a result
cannot be squared with Wheeler or the meaning of the represen-
tative cross-section rule.
DOUGLAS H. BARKER
152. Id. at 109, 593 P.2d at 605, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
153. See CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 198 (West 1954).
